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5. A->B: A sends message to B
6. [Data]key: Encrypting the data with a key
7. h(…): a strong one way hash function
8. Ks: session key between A, B and C
9. nA: a nonce generated by A
10. KAS1AS2: shared key between authentication server
AS1 and AS2
11. f(data): a function that generates key according to the
data

Abstract—The advent of conference mobile call demands the
security communication between end users. However,
currently there is no efficient secure end-to-end protocol exists
for conference mobile call. This slows down the steps of
conference communication. In this paper a secure end-to-end
protocol for remote conference is designed base on previous
experts work, which is one-to-one end-to-end protocol. In
addition, security analysis from perspectives of confidentiality,
authenticity, anonymity, freshness as well as preventing from
denial of service (DoS) attack on the protocol is made. At the
end, the efficiency of this protocol is discussed.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Conference mobile call is getting popular in many
companies. Instead of gathering together in a conference
room, people can launch meetings through mobile devices. It
makes conference possible wherever people are and creates
more profits. Despite the convenience of it, not much
concern is paid on the security of the conference mobile call.
In the year 1996, Yi Mu and Vijay Varadharajan Vijay
introduced a secure end-to-end protocol based on BCY and
Carlsen’s authentication protocols which are published in
1993 and 1994 respectively[1]. It can be used for one-to-one
secure mobile device communication by both symmetric and
asymmetric key based secure end-to-end protocols.
However, an end-to-end protocol that supports conference
mobile call has not been designed. In this paper, a secure
end-to-end protocol for conference mobile call based on Yi’s
protocol is introduced together with the analysis of it. It
enables members in remote conference communicate
securely.
II.

PROTOCOL

According to Yi and Vijay’s symmetric key base end-toend protocol. In the first two steps, A requests to get
authenticated herself from home authentication server (HAS)
through home server (HS) and generates a nonce which is
used for identify the session between. Then a session key
with B, KAB, is generated in step three after HAS’s
successful verification on the A’s identity. At the same time,
HAS gives A a subliminal ID from further request. In the
step four and five, the KAB will be delivered to A under the
encryption of shared key between A and HAS. After A gets
the message, she will response HAS that she has got the
message. HAS sends the same KAB together with the nonce
generated by A and a subliminal ID of B to B under the
encryption of shared key between HAS and B in step six. B
then responses HAS that he has got the message in step
seven. After A and B decrypt the messages from HAS
which contain the share key between them, they can
communicate with each other securely based on this
protocol.[1]

NOTATION USED

There are some notations used in the protocol and these
notations are listed as follows.
1. A, B, C : end users A, B, C
2. As, Bs, Cs: subliminal ID of user A, B and C
3. As’: new subliminal ID of A
4. AS1,AS2,AS3: authentication server 1, 2 and 3

c
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Figure 1. Communication Scenario
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However, this protocol cannot migrate to conference
secure communication because of its limitation of
authentication. Therefore, a protocol for conference mobile
call which can be used in the scenario given in Figure 1 is
introduced. As shown in Figure1, end user A is registered to
AS1, B is registered to AS2 and C is registered to AS3. B
moves to the AS1’s domain and this domain regards B as a
visitor. Assuming that A will launch a conference call and he
wants to set up a secure end-to-end communication between
A, B and C.
The brief authentication steps of this figure is that A
should first get authenticated from AS1, and then AS1 will
send A's request to AS3 in order to inform AS3 that A want
to talk to C. After A got the session key with C, he sends
another request to tell AS1 that B is requested to be talked.
Then AS1 will ask AS2 to authenticate end user B which is
in to domain of AS1.
We will have the protocol of setting up the
communication as follows:
Step1:A AS1:As,AS1,nA,[C]KAAS1,[h(As, AS1, nA, C)]KAAS1
Step2:AS1 AS3:AS1, AS3, nAS1,
[h(AS1,AS3,nAS1, nA, A,As,C, Ks)]KAS1AS3
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Step14:B AS1:AS1,Bs,[C]KBAS1,nB,[h(AS1,Bs,C,nB)]KBAS1,[B,
Bs,nB]Ks,[h(B,Bs,nB)]Ks
Step15:AS1 AS3:AS1,AS3,[C,Bs]KAS1AS3,nAS1''',[h(AS1,AS3,C,
Bs,nAS1''')]KAS1AS3,[B,Bs,nB]Ks ,[h(B,Bs,nB )]Ks
Step16:AS3 C:AS3,Cs',[C,Cs'',nAS3']KCAS3,[h(AS3,C,Cs',Cs'',n
')]KCAS3,[B,Bs,nB]Ks ,[h(B,Bs,nB)]Ks
AS3
Step17:C AS3:Cs',AS3,nAS3',[h(Cs',AS3,nAS3')]KCAS3,[C,Cs',B,
Bs,nB]Ks,[h(C,Cs',B,Bs,nB)]Ks
Step18:AS3 AS1:AS3,AS1,nAS1''',[h(AS3,AS1,nAS1''')]KAS1AS3,[C,
Cs',B,Bs,nB]Ks ,[h(C,Cs',B,Bs,nB)]Ks
Step19:AS1 B:AS1,Bs,nB,[h(AS1,
nB]Ks,[h(C,Cs',B,Bs,nB)]Ks

Bs,nB)]KBAS1,[C,Cs',B,Bs,

Step20:B C:Bs,Cs',[message'',nB']Ks,[h(Bs,Cs',message'', nB
')]Ks

[A,As,C,nA,Ks]KAS1AS3,

Step3:AS3 C:AS3, Cs, nAS3,[A, As, Cs ', C, nA, Ks]KCAS3,
[h(AS3,Cs,nAS3,nA, A, As, C, Ks)]KCAS3
Step4:C AS3:Cs,AS3,nAS3,[h(Cs,AS3,nAS3,nA,A,C,Ks )]KCAS3
Step5:AS3 AS1:AS3, AS1, nAS1,[Cs]KAS1AS2,[h(AS3,AS1,nAS1,
nA, A, C, Cs, Ks)]KAS1AS3
Step6:AS1 A:AS1,As,[Ks,As,Cs]KAAS1,nA,[h(AS1,A,C,Cs,As,
As ',nA,Ks)]KAAS1
Step7:A AS1:AS1,nA',[As,A,B]KAAS1,[h(AS1,nA',A,As,
B)]KAAS1
Step8:AS1 AS2:AS1,AS2,nAS1',[A, As, nA ', B, Ks]KAS1AS2
,[h(AS1, AS2, nA ', nAS1', A, As, B, Ks)]KAS1AS2
Step9:AS2 AS1:AS2,nAS1',[Bs,B,KBAS1]KAS1AS2,
[h(AS2,nAS1',Bs,B)]KAS1AS2,[B,Bs’,A,As,nA ',Ks]KBAS2,[h(B,Bs ',A,
As, nA ',Ks)]KBAS2
whereKBAS1 = f(AS2,Bs,KBAS2)
Step10:AS1 B: AS1, Bs, nAS1", [B, Bs ',A,As,nA ',Ks]KBAS2,
[h(B,Bs ',A,As, nA ',Ks)]KBAS2 , [h(AS1,Bs,nAS1")]KBAS1
Step11:B AS1:Bs,AS1,nAS1",[h(Bs,AS1,nAS1")]KBAS1
Step12:B A : Bs , As ,[message,nA ']Ks ,[h(Bs , As ,
message, nA ')]Ks
Step13:A C:As,Cs,nA",[message']Ks,[h(As,Cs,nA",
message')]Ks
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IV.

SECURITY ANALYSIS

A. Confidentiality
In order to ensure the confidentiality of the
communication, checksum is used in the protocol. The
message sent to the destination is first hashed using a strong
one why hash function, for instance, MD5, CRC32, SHA-1
etc. However, a hash value can be forged by an attacker who
launches the man-in-the-middle attack or brute force
attack[2]. Therefore, the hash value is then encrypted using
the share key between the sender and the receiver. When the
destination end gets that message, it can decrypt the message
and get the hash value. Then, it composites all the elements
except the encrypted hash value from the sender into a string
and hash that string using the corresponding hash algorithm.
The hash value got from the destination machine is
compared with the value from decryption. If these two
values are equivalent, then the receiver can make sure that
the message is not forged or modified.
B.

Authenticity
When it comes to authentication, there are two scenarios.
The first one is the end user stay at the domain of his or her
home authentication server (HAS) domain. The other one is
the end user who is registered with his or her HAS domain
moves to VAS (visitor authenticate server).
In the first scenario, as can be seen in the step1 A sends
the message [C]KAAS1 and [h(As,AS1,nA,C)]KAAS1 to
AS1. At the same time, AS1 gets A’s subliminal ID, As, as
well. It will match As with A’s real ID, and then find out the
share key between A and itself. Then this share key is used
to decrypted [C]KAAS1 and [h(As,AS1,nA,C)]KAAS1. A
successful decryption can make AS1 sure that it is talking to
A. However, if AS1 cannot decrypt the message, then it will
reject the request of the sender. AS1 can also record the IP
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address of the sender. If the same IP address causes more
three times failed attempt, the AS1 will block the IP address
for a period of time to protect the shared key from being
compromised from brute force attack.
When it comes to the second scenario which is the end
user migrating to a VAS, the authentication method turns to
be a little complex. In the protocol, B, which is registered to
the AS2, moves to AS1. And as can be seen in figure 1, AS1
is B’s VAS. B has to get authenticated from AS2 and AS1 is
used as a media between B and AS2. In the protocol, step 7,
8, 9, 10 and 11 do the authentication for B. A firstly sends
the AS1 the request of communicating to B. Then AS1 sends
this request to AS2. When AS2 gets this request from B, it
will give AS1 a message containing a token, [B, Bs ', A, As,
nA', Ks]KBAS2, which is encrypted under KBAS2 and a
message containing KBAS1 which can be decrypted using
the share key between AS1 and AS2. AS1 then sends the
token to B, but AS1 itself has no able to get the information
inside of the token. This protects the communication
between AS2 and B. After B receiving the message from
AS1, it can calculate the shared key between AS1 and itself.
Because B knows AS2, Bs, KBAS2 and the mobile device
can calculate the where KBAS1 f(AS2,Bs,KBAS2). This
key can be used to ensure the confidentiality of the message
from AS1. If B can decrypt the token, then B is
authenticated.
Anonymity
In order to protect end users’ actual identity, subliminal
ID is used in the protocol.The real identity is stored in the
AS. When the end AS receives the subliminal ID from the
end user, it will match the subliminal ID with the actual ID
in its database.
A subliminal ID creates a subliminal channel between the
sender and the receiver and prevents the sender’s private
information from being exposed to the public[3]. A man-inthe-middle attack can intercept the identity of the end user
and know the identity of the end user.
After the end user being authenticated, a new subliminal
ID for the corresponding end user is sent back. Then the end
user’s mobile device can record this subliminal ID for future
usage. This can ensure no same subliminal ID is used for the
same end user. In the protocol given above, the new
subliminal ID As’ is encrypted under the shared key between
A and AS1. This can guarantee that only A can decrypt this
message and record this new subliminal ID.
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E.

Preventing from DoS attack
The Denial of Service(DoS) attack from in the home
domain is easy to prevent. If the authentication failed, the
HAS can just reject the connection and free the memory. If a
same IP continuously send request to HAS, the HAS can
simply block that IP address. Liu X, Yang X and Lu Y
introduced a filter-based DoS defence system called StopIt in
2008, which is a very efficient measure of preventing from
DoS attack[6].
However, if a user goes to a VAS and he or she wants
launch a conference call first. The VAS is vulnerable from
DoS attack. Because, VAS cannot confirm the sender’s
identity before sending that request to the sender’s HAS. The
solution to this defect is to authenticate the sender
automatically when the sender goes to a VAS domain. In this
way, the sender’s authentication information can be migrated
from HAS’s database to VAS’ database. Because VAS and
HAS trust each other and they have a share key for
communication between them. So the customers’
authentication information is secure. After the data
migration, VAS can authenticate sender’s identity without
the sender’s home domain when the sender wants to launch a
conference call first. What worth mentioning is that VAS
should delete visitors’ authentication information after visitor
leaves VAS domain to decrease rate of loss if VAS’s
database is compromised.

C.

D.

Freshness
nonce is used in the protocol for freshness. The nonce is
a non-repeat number. It can be used for preventing the
server from replay attack. How to make the nonce
unpredictable is significant for freshness[4].
A new replay attack against Tor, which is a real-world,
circuit-based low latency anonymous communication
network, is introduced in 2008. And the countermeasure
given is to monitor duplicate cells. [5] The nonce in the
protocol, for instance nA, can uniquely identify a session
between the sender and the receiver, so this end-to-end
protocol is secure from replay attack.

V2-432

V.

EFFICIENCY

The end-to-end protocol for conference call introduce in
this paper has high efficiency. Hash function is used for
generating checksum. If cells in message are simply
concatenated and then encrypted under encryption
algorithms, it brings great burden to the encryption
algorithms like AES, DES etc. There are many different
problems of hashing such as Dynamic hashing,
Cryptographic hashing, Geometric hashing, Robust hashing,
Bloom hash, String hashing[7]. Which algorithm is to be
used in the protocol depends on the time and security
requests from companies. Because of the variation of request
and condition, simulation used for comparing efficiency on
this protocol hasn’t been done. That means there is no best
algorithm, but the most suitable for a specific company
depends on its business request.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The end-to-end protocol for conference mobile call
introduced in this paper can ensure the secure
communication between end users in difference AS domains.
It protects end user’s private information and communication
message. At the same time, authentication server can be
protected from different kind of attacks. The analysis on the
protocol makes a deeper exploration in the protocol from the
aspects of confidentiality, authenticity, anonymity, freshness
and preventing from DoS.
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